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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KEN KNEPPER 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 
10614 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ken Knepper, appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court of Weber County, en-
tering a conviction against the appellant for viola-
tion of Section 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended (1961), for the failure to return to the 
owner leased equipment within ten days after the 
expiration of the lease or rental agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with a violation of 
Section 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended (1961). A motion was filed by the appel-
lant to quash the information. The trial court, the 
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge, denied the 
motion to quash. Jury trial was waived (R. 7), and 
the appellant was tried on the 18th day of February, 
1966. Upon completion of the evidence, Judge Cow-
ley entered a finding of guilty and on March I, 1966, 
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sentenced the appellant to be committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by 
law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the conviction en-
tered by the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following state-
ment of facts: 
Mr. Don Kammeyer, the owner and manager of 
Kammeyer' s Sports Store, in Weber County, testi-
fied that he buys, sells, and leases typewriters (Tr. 
3 and 4). On October 30, 1964, the appellant, Ken 
Knepper, executed Exhibit A, whic;h was a rental 
loan agreement for a Royal standard typewriter, 
Serial No. HHE-6122225. The rental was $8.00 per 
month and the typewriter was valued at $140.00 
(Exhibit A - Tr. 5 and 6). The appellant gave a busi-
ness address at Building 95, Freeport Center, Clear-
field, Utah, and a home address of 1184 So. 1000 
East, Clearfield, Utah. The appellant paid the $8.00 
fee on the first month's rental, but made no other 
payments (Tr. 7). Approximately a week after the 
expiration of the first month's rental, Mr. Kammeyer 
called the appellant. The appellant said that he 
would either bring $8.00 in or bring the typewriter 
back. The appellant never brought the typewriter 
in or paid any sum for an additional rental period 
(Tr. 8). Mr. Kammeyer went to the appellant's house, 
but was unable to locate the typewriter (Tr. 8). He 
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tried on other occasions to get the appellant c1t 
home, but was unable to locate him (Tr. 9). Mr. Kam-
meyer thereafter went to the Freeport Center and 
found that the office area supposedly occupied by 
the appellant was locked and he could not see the 
typewriter (Tr. 9). 
Appellant's trial was held on the 18th day of 
February, 1966, and at the time of trial, the appellant 
had never returned the typewriter. Mr. Kammeyer 
asked the Freeport management to endeavor to find 
the typewriter, and was told that it could not be 
found (Tr. 17). 
The appellant admitted the execution of Exhibit 
A and stated that at the time he was arrested, he 
was employed in Long Beach, California, on a con-
struction project building an extension to a roller 
coaster (Tr. 19). He indicated that he did not recall 
the discussion with Mr. Kammeyer subsequent to 
the expiration of the rental period (Tr. 20), but did 
not deny that there could have been such a conver-
sation. The appellant stated that he was a sign 
painter by trade, and that the typewriter had been 
used in conjunction with the promotion of a business 
of sign painting which he was conducting at the 
Freeport Center. The appellant admitted that the 
typewriter had been kept at the home of two boys 
who were associated with him in the sign painting 
operation (Tr. 24). He stated that he gave the type-
writer to a Danny Buckley and that it had been 
placed in Richard Jensen's car. He stated that this 
was around the time that his sign painting operation 
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had collapsed for lack of capital. The appellant ad 
mitted that he never returned the typewriter and 
that he didn't contact Mr. Kammeyer. He stated that 
he had told the boys to take the typewriter back 
(Tr. 38). He stated that at the time he gave the type-
writer to the two boys, he stated: 
"Yes. I just said, 'Here. You guys are going that way. 
I am going this way.'" 
He stated that approximately two months after the 
business closed, he left for California (Tr. 32). He ad-
mitted that he didn't tell the boys where he got the 
typewriter, but stated that they "evidently knew" 
(Tr. 39). The appellant presumed that Mr. Kammeyer 
had contacted him after he delivered the typewriter 
to Danny Buckley (Tr. 41). He did nothing thereafter 
to see that the typewriter was delivered. 
The appellant had been convicted of the felony 
of operating a confidence game in the State of Colo-
rado and served time in prison (Tr. 28). Neither Dan-
ny Buckley nor Richard Jensen were ever produced 
as witnesses. The appellant also indicated that the 
boys had stated that they were going to keep some 
other equipment he had to cover their expenses. 
Appellant testified he told them not to keep it but 
return it to the proper owner. 
Based upon the above evidence, Judge Cowley 
entered a judgment of guilty. 
POINT I. 
(A) THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTAB-
LISH THE APPELLANT'S GUILT. 
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(B) THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO HAVE DENIED THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE PROSE-
CUTION'S CASE AND THE APPELLANT, HAVING 
GONE FORWARD AND OFFERED EVIDENCE, HAS 
WAIVED ANY INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
AT THAT TIME. 
The appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate his guilt. The primary 
assault on the State's case is the contention that the 
evidence did not show the requisite willfulness in 
failing to return the typewriter. The appellant con-
tends that the evidence is insufficient to prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be re-
membered that the question of whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt 
must now be viewed in a light most favorably with 
the trial court's. decision. Only if it can be said that 
the evidence, when so viewed would show tha.t 
Judge Cowley's determination of guilt was complete-
ly unreasonable, would this court be justified in re-
versing the trial court's decision. 
In State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959), 
this court stated as to the standard of reviewing the 
decision of trial courts in criminal cases: 
"The rules governing the scope of review on appeal 
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative of 
the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and 
to determine the facts; that the evidence will be re-
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; and 
that if when so viewed it appears that the jury act-
ing fairly and reasonably could find the defendant 
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will 
not be disturbed." 
Section 76-17-51 Utah Code Annotated, 19531 as 
amended (196 n deals with embezzlements by bail-
ees/ tenants or attorneys in fact. The law was last 
amended in 196L Laws of Utah 196L Chapter 1761 
Section 1. The pertinent part of the statute applicable 
to the instant case now reads: 
"Every person who has leased or rented a motor 
vehicle, trailer, appliance, tool or other valuable 
thing, and who willfully fails to return the same to 
its owner within ten days after the lease or rental 
agreement has expired, is guilty of embezzlement." 
It is apparent that the elements of the offense are 
the leasing of valuable property and the willful 
failure to return the same to its owner within ten 
days after the expiration of the lease or rental agree-
ment. The appellant's principal challenge is that the 
willfulness of his actions in failing to return the prop-
erty to Mr. Kammeyer is not established by the ev~­
dence. The gist of the appellant's argument seems 
to be that willfulness requires something more than 
what the evidence on appeal demonstrates. It is sub-
mitted that the appellant's position starts from an 
erroneous premise. 
Section 76-1-3(1)/ Utah Code Annotated1 19531 
defines the use of the term "willfully" when used in 
the penal code as follows: 
"(1) The term 'willfully,' when applied to the intent 
with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply 
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a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make 
the omission referred to. It does not require any 
intent to violate law or to injure another or to ac-
quire any advantage." 
The appellant contends that this definition is mean-
ingless, and that what should actually be required 
is the standard imposed in the case of United States 
v. Murdock. 290 U.S. 399 (1933), quoted on page 12 
of appellant's brief, that the action be done "with a 
particular purpose ... without justifiable excuse 
... stubbornly, obstinately, perversely .. .. "The ap-
pellant's contention that this standard should be im-
posed is directly contrary to the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition set forth in Section 76-1-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The last sentence of 
the definition of the term "willfully," above quoted, 
indicates that there need not be any intent to vio-
late the law or to act in a malicious manner. 
In State v. Roedl. 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 
(1945), this court expressly indicated that the use of 
a statutory definition in instructing the jury was not 
error, apparently feeling that the language was suf-
ficiently clear that no jury could mistake the re-
quired finding. The language in the definition part 
of the Utah statute is, for the most part, directly con-
trary to the cases that the appellant urges this court 
to follow in requiring a showing of some intent to-
wards a deliberate wrongdoing. 
Courts have long got awa_y from the standard 
of willfulness that the appellant now seeks to press 
upon this court. In People v. Faber, 29 Cal.App.2d 
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751, 77 P.2d 921, the California court stated: 
"There is, of course, no doubt that 'the word "will-
fully" as used in the criminal law, implies simply the 
purpose or willingness to commit the unlawful act.' 
People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California 
Protective Corporation, 76 Cal. App. 354, 363, 244 
P. 1089, 1092. It does not necessarily imply any 
specific intent to violate law or to injure another and, 
where specific intent is not part of the definition of 
the crime, such intent as is required to make out the 
crime is conclusively presumed from the intentional 
performance of the act denounced though the off end-
er was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the 
law.'' 
At common law, there was some confusion as to 
the mental element required in a crime. There were 
distinctions drawn between criminal intent and 
malice which necessarily confused the- intent that 
would be required for particular offenses. See l 
Burdick, Law of Crime, Sections 112, 113, 114, 115, 
116, 117, and 122. 
A careful analysis of the development of the 
concept of mens rea is set forth in Hall, General 
Principals of Criminal Law, 2d Ed., Chapter 3, page 
70. At page 104, in summarizing the conclusions, it 
is stated: 
"In sum: ( 1) the professional literature, especially 
beginning with Hale, distinguished mens rea from 
motive. Mans rea, a fusion of cognition and volition, 
is the mental state expressed in the voluntary com-
mission of a proscribed harm. (2) The exclusion of 
motive, as not essential in mens rea, does not deny 
the importance of motive in determining the culp-
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ability, ('guilt') of the defendant. Instead, the reason 
for doing that is the necessity to preserve the ob-
jectivity of the principle of mens rea and the principle 
of legality, i.e. to signify some degree of culpability 
regardless of how good the motive was. Thus ques-
tions of motivation and mitigating circumstances are 
allocated to administration which can explore such 
issues thoroughly. (3) Implied in the above con-
clusions is that the principle of mens rea must be 
given an objective ethical meaning - the premise 
being that actual harms (disvalues) are proscribed. 
Accordingly, neither the offender's conscience nor the 
personal code of ethics of the judge or the jury can 
be substituted for the ethics of the penal law. The 
insistence that guilt should be personal must be in-
terpreted to accord with the paramount value of the 
objectivity of the principle of mens rea." 
The fact that willfulness is merely another 
means of expressing voluntary intent in the criminal 
law is acknowledged in Williams, Criminal Law, 2d 
Ed., The General Part, Section 16 (1961). 
The model Penal Code no longer uses the terms 
"willful" or "intentional", but rather, combines all 
the mental elements into the standard of knowledge. 
Model Penal Code, SS 2.02(2)(b), 2.02(8). 
Consequently, it is apparent that the Legislature 
merely intended that under the provisions of Sec-
tion 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
(1961), the failure of the defendant to return leased 
property within ten days of the expiration of the 
lease agreement be intentional as distinct from neq-
ligent. The statute is, itself, nothing more than a 
broader and more specific definition of the crim.:: 
of embezzlement as it existed at common law. 2 
Burdick, Law of Crime, Section 575g; Clark and 
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Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., pagss 804, 807, 812. 
A number of cases have recogniezd that an in-
dividual may be guilty of embezzlement by the 
failure to return property in accordance with the 
rental agreement. Annotation, 45 A.L.R.2d 623. Proof 
of the required intent generally can only be evi-
denced by the words or conduct of the person 
claimed to have entertained it, but, of course the 
intent may be shown by the circumstances of the 
case. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Embezzlement, Section 53. The 
conversion of the property is, itself, evidence of an 
intent to embezzle. 26 Am. Jur.2d, Embezzlement, 
Section 56. 
In Chapman v. the State. 90 Okl. Crim. 224, 2l 2 
P.2d 485 (1949), the defendant was convicted of 
larceny of a rented automobile by fraud. The Okla-
homa court acknowledged that the -intent to commit 
the larceny by fraud could be shown by circum-
stantial evidence. The defendant was tried by trial 
court without jury. The court stated: 
"But the question of intent to commit larceny is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury under 
the circumstances and the evidence." 
The court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
show the required intent. The facts in that case bectr 
resemblance to those in the instant case. 
The facts in the instant case clearly support the 
trial court's verdict. There was no question but what 
the appellant signed the rental loan agreement, 
paid only one month's rent, and did not return the 
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property within ten days after the termination of the 
rental agreement. Within a week after the expira-
tion of the rental agreement and before the ten days 
had expired, the appellant was contacted by Mr. 
Kammeyer on the telephone and advised to either 
return the property or make another rental pay-
ment. The appellant said that he would do so the 
next Monday. He did not do so. The appellant clear-
ly was awa.re of his obligation to see that the rent::1l 
was paid on the property rented. The appellant's 
testimony (a convicted felon) was to the effect that 
he advised Mr. Danny Buckley to return the prop-
erty but did not tell him where to return the prop-
erty, and apparently did not turn the property over 
to Danny, as indicated in the appellant's brief, until 
after the ten-day period had expired (appellant's 
brief, page 8 - Tr. 32, 37). The appellant never made 
inquiry from Mr. Ka_mmeyer as to whether the ma.-
chine had beeri returned and left for California. The 
appellant was also aware that the boys who had 
been working for him were claiming interest in his 
property for the value of their services and invest-
ment. 
Based on this evidence, it was well within the 
trial court's prerogative to find the appellant guilty. 
The appellant contends that the trial court 
should have dismissed the case at the end of the 
State's evidence. The respondent submits that there 
is no merit to that contention that the evidence did 
not make out a prima fade case at the time the State 
rested. However, even assuming for the sake of ar-
gument, that the trial court erred, the appellant did 
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rely upon the State's evidence alone, but went fo~­
ward with his own evidence, and the appellant, him-
self, made admissions on the stand which tended to 
impeach his credibility and support the conclusion 
that he was guilty of the offense. Consequently, the 
appellant waived any claim of error for the trial 
court's failure to dismiss at the end of the State's 
case. 
In Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2496, it is stated: 
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advantage of 
the judge's original erroneous refusal to direct a ver-
dict for insufficiency at the time of the first motion, 
(a) if he does not renew the motion at the close of 
all the evidence, or (h) or if at the time of the final 
motion the ruling correctly refuses to order a verdict 
for insufficiency; for the Court is at that time en-
titled to decide upon a survey of the whole evidence; 
and this survey naturally renders any prior er;:or 
immaterial. ':' * *" 
In State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W.2d 449 
(1944), the court said: 
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first demurrer) 
but presented evidence in his own behalf, the trial 
court was bound to take the latter evidence into con-
sideration insofar as it helped the State's case, in 
ruling on the second demurrer at the close of the 
whole case." 
Since the appellant chose to go forward in this 
case, the only question is whether the evidence at 
the end of the State's case was sufficient to establish 
the appellant's guilt. Since it was, there is no merit 
to the appellant's contention on appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S WILLFUL FAILURE TO RETURN 
A LEASED TYPEWRITER IS A CRIME ENCOMPASS-
ED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 76-17-5, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED (1961). 
The appellant's final contention is that his fail-
ure to return the leased typewriter is not encom-
passed within the provisions of Section 76-17-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by Laws of Utah 
1961, Chapter 176, Section 1. The appellant's con-
tention is based upon the theory of ejusdem generis. 
In effect, the appellant contends that since motor ve-
hicles, trailers, appliances, equipment, and tools are 
mentioned specifically that a typewriter is not en-
compassed within the language "or other valuable 
thing." Appellant also relies upon the maxim of 
noscitur a sociss, which is somewhat broader than 
the theory of ejusdem generis in that it means gen-
erally that general and specific words which are 
capc.~ble of analogous meaning, being associated to-
gether, take color from each other so that the gen-
eral words are restricted to a sense, analogous to 
the less general. Townsend v. State. 63 Fla. 46, .57 
So. 611. However, it is submitted that there is no 
merit b the appellant's contention. The very lan-
guage of the statute. itself, evidences a legislative 
intent to encompass items of a valuable nature 
which may be the subject of lease or rental agree-
ments. There is no continuity of class in the words 
"motor vehicle, traller, appliance, equipment, er 
tool." Under such circumstances, it is well estab-
14 
lished that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is net 
applicable. 
In Sutherla.nd, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed .. 
Volume 2, Section 4910, it is stated: 
"The doctrine applies when the following conditions 
exist: ( 1) the statute contains an enumeration by 
specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration 
constitute a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by 
the enumeration; ( 4) a general term follows the 
enumeration; and ( 5) there is not clearly manifested 
an intent that the general term be given a broader 
meaning than the doctrine requires. 
A 'class' is an artificial creation to provide ease in 
dealing with numerous items with similar character-
istics. Thus, 'a class' is a generalization which ac-
curately or inaccurately associates items for a par-
ticular purpose or treatment. Vvithout some objec-
tive or purpose classification is impossible. Conse-
questly, the rule of ejusdem generis depending as it 
does on pme form provides a dangerous yardstick 
with which to r.1easure the statutory coverage which 
the legislature intended." 
Further, Sutherland, supra, Section 4912, no:.es tho.+ 
if there is no reasonable enumeration attempted bv 
the Legislature, or the terms used by the language 
are themselves broad, the doctrine of ejusdem gen-
eris is not applicable. 
In Higler v. People, 44 Mich. 299, 6 N.W. Ge~ 
(1880), the Michigan Supreme Court noted that a 
statute making criminal certain forms of cheats and 
frauds or by means of "any false trust or writing c,r 
by any other false pretense," was in itself so general 
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and without classification as to render the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis inapplicable. 
A similar result was reached in Jones v. State. 
104 Ark. 261, 149 S.W. 56 (1912), where the court 
found that a statute relating to suspension from oi-
fice of certain public officials involved terms so en-
tirely unalike and antagonistic in meaning as to re;:-1-
der the doctrine of ejusdem generis inapplicable. 
Further, Sutherland, supra, Section 4914, also notes: 
"A final qualification on the doctrine is that the 
general words are not restricted in meaning to objects 
ejusdem generis if there is a clear manifestation of a 
contrary intent." 
This court has had occasion to recognize the 
above mentioned limitation on the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis. in Nephi Plaster and Manufactur-
ing Company v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac. 
53. In that case, an action was brought to recover a 
tax imposed upon gymsum obtained from a mine, 
where the applicable language imposed a tax on "all 
mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in 
pbce, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper, 
lead, coal, or other valuable mineral deposits***" 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Section 4, Article 
XIII, January 4, 1896. This court rejected the conten-
tion that the doctrine of ejusdem generis was ap-
plicable and stated: 
"We think that it is reasonably clear, that the phrase 
'or other valuable mineral deposits,' was not intended 
to contain minerals only ejusdem generis with the 
metals specially named, but that it was intended that 
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all mineral deposits should be taxed in this way, and 
not only metalliferous minerals and coal. 
In adopting this construction, we think we are su-
stained by the authorities. In speaking of the appli-
cation of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, Suther-
land on Statutory Construction, sec. 279, says: 
'It (the doctrine) affords a mere suggestion 
to the judicial mind that, where it clearly ap-
pears that the lawmaker was thinking of a par-
ticular class of persons or subjects, his words of 
more general description may not have been in-
tended to embrace any other than those within 
the class. The suggestion is one of common 
sense. Other rules of construction are equally 
potent, especially the primary rule which sug-
gests that the intent of the Legislature is to be 
found in the ordinary meaning of the words of 
the statute. The sense in which general words, or 
any words, are intended to be used, furnishes the 
rule of interpretation, and this is to be collected 
from the context; and a narrower or more ex-
tended meaning will be given, according as the 
i'1tmtion is thus indicated. To deny any word 
or phrase its known and natural meaning in any 
instance, the court ought to be quite sure that 
they are following the legislative intention. 
Hence, though a general term follows specific 
words, it will not be restricted by them when the 
object of the act and the intention is that the 
general word shall be understood in its ordinary 
sense.' 
The foregoing test is well illustrated and supported 
by a great number of decisions, among which are the 
following well-considered cases: Woodworth v. State, 
26 Ohio St. 196; Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687; State 
vs. Solomon, 33 Ind. 450; Tisdell v. Comb, 7 A. & E. 
(Ewlish Common Law) 223, 788. 
'The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of 
construction,' says the Supreme Court of Min-
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nE:,o~a, ~nd is intended 'to aid in the ascertain-
ing the meaning of the Legislature, and does not 
w:taant a court in confining the operation of a 
:-;'.-.atutc within narrower limits than intended by 
the lawmakers. The general object of an act 
sometimes requires that the final general term 
shall not be restricted in meaning by its more 
specific predecessors.' (Willis v. Mabon, 48 
Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 16 L.R.A. 281, 31 
Arn. St. Rep. 626.) 
The following cases are to the same effect: Webber 
v. Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 36 N.E. 70; Lent v. Portland, 
42 Ore. 488, 71 Pac. 645. The foregoing statement, it 
seems to us, is most pertinent with regard to the 
meaning to be given to the phrase 'or other valuable 
mineral deposits.' To restrict this phrase so as to in-
clude no more than metalliferous deposits would, in 
view of what we have said about the production of 
c12tals in this state, practically rob the phrase of any 
meaning whatever. It would simply eliminate from 
consideration all other nonmetallic valuable mineral 
deposits of this state, of which there are a great num-
ber. To do this, as we read the constitutional provi-
sion, was manifestly not the intention of the framers 
thereof, nor do we think that such was the intent that 
the people had of it when they adopted the Consti-
tution." 
In Salt Lake City v. Doran. 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 
636 (1913), this court again was called upon to apply 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The court was con-
struing Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Section 4261, 
as amended Laws of Utah 1911, page 265, prohibit-
ing certain gambling activities. A large number of 
games were mentioned as being illegal, followed 
by the phrase "or any game played with cards, dice, 
or any other device***." The court ruled that ejus-
dem generis was not applicable, stating: 
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"In our judgment the legislature, in adding the phrase 
in italics, clearly intended to cover and include any 
and all other games played with cards, in whatever 
form the cards should be used, and also all other 
devices where the use thereof amounted to gambling 
as that term is popularly understood. We had oc-
casion to discuss somewhat at length the application 
of the doctrine or maxim of ejusdem generis in the 
case of Plaster :Mfg, Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 
124, 126, 93 Pac. 57, 58. We there pointed out that 
the doctrine is but a rule of construction to aid courts 
in ascertaining the meaning and to prevent their 
transcending the intention of the legislature when 
using general terms following particular ones in the 
enactment of laws. It is there held, in effect, that, 
when the meaning or intention of the lawmaker is 
clear, the doctrine cannot be applied for the purpose 
of narrowing or limiting the meaning of a word or 
phrase so as to defeat the legislative intent. We can-
not, nor is it now necessary, to add anything to what 
is said upon the subject in the case referred to. It 
must suffice to say that it is as clear in this case as 
it was in that that the doctrine has no application." 
In the instant case, it is clear from the fact that 
there is no continuity of classification in the items 
set forth in the statute, and by the additional fact 
that the enumeration of items is, itself, general, that 
the Legislature did not intend the statute to be 
limited to any particular type of equipment, tool, or 
instrument. Any valuable thing which was the sub-
ject of a personal property lease or rental was in-
tended to be encompassed by the statute. Indeed, 
a typewriter could well fit within the term "equip-
ment," since, according to the testimony of the ap-
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pellant, the typewriter was to be used in conjunc-
tion with his business. m 
In United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950), the 
Supreme Court of the United States was concerned 
with the question of whether phonograph records 
were included within a statute prohibiting the ship-
ment in interstate commerce of any "obscene *** 
book, pamphlet, picture, motion picture film, paper, 
letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent 
character." The United States Supreme Court re-
versed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, applying the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis, (175 F.2d 137, 9th Cir. 1949): 
"When properly applied, the rule of ejusdem generis 
is a useful canon of construction. But it is to be re-
sorted to not to obscure and defeat the intent and 
purpose of Congress, but to elucidate its words and 
effectuate its intent. It cannot be employed to render 
general words meaningless. Mason v. United States, 
260 U.S. 545, 554, 43 S.Ct. 200, 202, 67 L.Ed. 396. 
What is or is not a proper case for application of the 
rule was discussed in Gooch v. United States, 297 
U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 396, 80 L.Ed. 522. In that case 
a bandit and a companion had kidnapped two police 
officers for the purpose of avoiding arrest and had 
transported the.m across a state line. The defendant 
was convicted of kiddnapping under a federal statute 
which made it an offense to transport across state 
lines any person who had been kidnapped 'and held 
for ransom or reward or otherwise.' The police officers 
had been held not for ransom or reward but for pro-
tection, and it was contended that the words 'or oth-
(1) This would be in accord with the definition of "equipment" under the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-7-109(2), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, Supplement. 
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erwise' did not cover the defendant's conduct, since 
under the rule of ejusdem generis, the general phrase 
was limited in meaning to some kind of monetary 
reward. This Court rejected such limiting applica-
tion of the rule, saying: 'The rule of ejusdem generis, 
while firmly established, is only an instrumentality 
for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when 
there is uncertainty. Ordinarily, it limits general 
terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to 
those specified; but it may not be used to defeat the 
obvious purpose of legislation. And, while penal sta-
tutes are narrowly construed, this does not require 
rejection of that sense of the words which best har-
monizes with the context and the end in view.' 297 
U.S. at page 128, 56 S.Ct. at page 397. 
We think that to apply the rule of ejusdem generis to 
the present case would be 'to defeat the obvious pur-
pose of legislation.' The obvious purpose of the legis-
lation under consideration was to prevent the chan-
nels of interstate commerce from being used to dis-
seminate any matter that, in its essential nature, 
communicate obscene, lewd, lasciVious or filthy 
ideas. * * * It will be noted that Congress legislated 
with respect to a number of evils in addition to those 
proscribed by the portion of the statute under which 
respondent was charged. Statutes are construed in 
their entire context. This is a comprehensive statute, 
which should not be constricted by a mechanical rule 
of construction. * * *" 
Nor is there any merit to the appellant's conten-
tion that the maxim of strict construction of penal 
statutes is involved. First, the statute is rather clear 
on its face that willfully failing to return rented prop-
erty within ten days is criminal misconduct. Further, 
the statute is adequate to show a legislative inten-
tion to cover all facets of leased and rented property. 
· Finally, the doctrine of limited construction of penal 
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statutes has no applicability to Utah law in general. 
Section 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"* * * The statutes establish the laws of this state 
respecting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them are 
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice. * * *" 
This court has previously indicated that the rule 
of strict construction of penal statutes is not applica-
ble in Utah, and the same rules of statutory construc-
tion applicable in civil cases are generally applied 
in criminal cases. State v. Ledkins, 303 P.2d 1099, 
5 U.2d 422 (1956). 
The legislative policy in enacting the statute 
presently before the court was clearly to abate d 
serious problem of bailees converting leased or 
rented property. The actions of the appellant clearly 
fall within the ambit of the statute, and the argument 
that a typewriter is not encompassed within the 
subjects of the statute is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of the instant case amply demonstrate 
the appellant's guilt. There is no basis upon which 
this court could state that the evidence of the ap-
pellant's guilt was not proved at the time of trial 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant's conten-
tion that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is some-
how applicable to exclude the embezzled type-
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writer from the statute has no basis in a proper con-
struction of the statute. 
There is no legitimate basis warranting reversal 
of the appellant's conviction, and this court should 
affirm. 
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